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ABSTRACT
There has been a significant interest on a theoretical level in the
application of supergames to oligopoly behavior. Implications for
pricing behavior in trigger—strategy models in response to aggregate
demand are of particular importance for public policy considerations.
We contrast the predictions for the movements of industry prices over
the business cycle of two such models——put forth by Edward Green and
Robert Porter and by Julio Rotemberg and Garth Saloner——and test the
predictions using a panel data set of U.S. manufacturing industries.
Our principal findings are four. First, the levels of price—cost
margins of concentrated, homogeneous—goods industries, while higherthan
those of unconcentrated counterparts, appear to be closer to those
predicted by a single—period Cournot—Nash equilibrium than monopoly.
Second, there is little evidence to support the idea that price—cost
margins of these industries have different cyclical patterns fromother
industries apart from effects by level of industry concentration.
Maximum price declines for concentrated industries give little support
for the occurrence of price wars during either recessions or booms.
Finally, consistent with the predictions of the Rotemberg—Saloner model,
the industries with high price—cost margins have more countercyclical
price movements than those exhibited by other industries.That gradual
price adluatment is quantitatively important for those industries,



















Evanston, IL 60201I. INTRODUCTION
Whether oligopolists are able to achieve collective outcomes
approaching that of a monopolist is an issue of considerable debate in
theoretical industrial economics; its relevance for public policy is
clear. Recent theoretical work on oligopoly supergames has demonstrated
that, for a wide range of situations, oligopolists may be able to
approximate cooperative outcomes in games which are (structurally)
noncooperative.1
In this paper we focus on two recent and innovative supergames
models involving trigger strategies and generating predictions about the
cyclical behavior of prices——those of Green and Porter [19841 and
Rotemberg and Saloner [1986].
In the model of Green and Porter, demand shifts are imperfectly
observed by oligopolists and output does not vary as long as price
remains above the trigger price. Since all adjustments occur through
price unless a reversion occurs, prices and price—cost margins shouldbe
procyclical with the possibility of occasional very sharp price
declines. It is possible that firms might actually expand production
during a recession, dampening cyclical downswings.
In contrast, Rotemberg and Saloner assume that demand shifts are
perfectly observable and versions of their model predict that price—cost
margins should be countercyclical. That is, oligopolists behave more
competitively during booms. Thus, a shift in demand toward goods
produced by oligopolists may cause an increase in the output of all
sectors, bringing about a boom. The opposite can occur ifdemand shifts
away from oligopolistic sectors. The assumptions and predictionsof
these two models are further described in the next section of the paper.—2—
An empirical test of the predictions of these models in particular,
and oligopoly supergames in general, is best undertaken with panel
data. Using information on four—digit—S.I.C. level manufacturing
industries over the period from 1958 to 1981, we focus on a subset of
industries having structural characteristics closely resembling those
cited by Green and Porter and Rotemberg and Saloner. While oligopoly
supergames predict that prices and margins will on averagebe above the
Cournot levels, this need not be true for all time periods (see for
example Green and Porter [1984)). It is desirable, therefore, to
examine several years of data for any given industry. The use of
longitudinal data also allows for tests that distinguish between
individual models employing trigger strategies.
In section III we examine whether the price—cost margins of any
industry ever approach collusive levels in any time period covered by
the available data. We find that margins for our sample of highly
concentrated industries are on average higher than margins in
unconcentrated industries, but they more closely resemble the predicted
levels of a single—period Cournot equilibrium than that of monopoly.
This finding alone, however, is not conclusive evidence that
oligopolists never engage in the quasi—cooperative arrangements implied
by trigger equilibria strategies. There are many reasons whythe
sustainable outcomes in such games may not be on the profit—possibility
frontier.
In section IV we examine the cyclical behavior of margins and
prices for a subset of highly concentrated oligopolistic industries
exhibiting above average price—cost margins over the 1958—1981 period.
Census price—cost margins are procyclical for concentrated industries,—3—
although less so for high—margin than low—margin industries. We find no
evidence for reversions from cooperative to Cournot behavior as in Green
and Porter. Finally, price movements among highly concentrated, high
price—cost margin industries are countercyclical.
[1. TRIGGER STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM
The basic concept of trigger strategies was first discussed by Luce
and R.aiffa [1957] with respect to repeated games based on the Prisoner's
Dilemma. An excellent overview of the literature that followed and a
description of the conditions for trigger—strategy equilibria are given
by Friedman [1986, chapter 3]. Simply put, these equilibria are
agreements, possibly including the joint—profit maximizing outcome,
which can be enforced by the threat of retaliation in the event of
defection. That is, in response to a violation, all players agree to
revert to a (single—period) noncooperative equilibrium. Because the
threat involves playing noncooperative strategies, it must be credible;
the equilibrium is subgame perfect (in the sense described by Selten
[1975]).
Recent work involving infinite and finite—horizon supergames has
demonstrated that trigger strategies are viable under a wide range of
conditions. Friedman [1985] derives the conditions under which finite—
horizon trigger strategies exist. He also shows that where trigger
strategies do not exist, the discontinuity between infinite and finite
horizons can be smoothed if the players no longer seek perfect
optimization in their strategies. Furthermore, if players are "close"
to behaving optimally, then trigger—strategy "epsilon—equilibria" are—4—
possible if games have sufficiently long but finite horizons (see Radner
[19801).
We now turn to two well known models involving trigger
strategies. Green and Porter [1984] examine an oligopoly situation
where the industry is presumed to be stable (mature), products are
homogeneous, and all available information is public knowledge except
for each firm's knowledge about its own present and past output
levels. Firms cannot perfectly observe the level of industry demand in
each period and the output choices of their competitors; they agree on a
"trigger price" to which they compare the market price when they make
their production decision. If the market price remains above the
trigger price, all firms agree to produce at a cooperative level. If,
however, the price drops below the trigger price, all firms agree to
revert to the one—shot (Cournot) equilibrium for some fixed period of
time. A firm which considers a secrete expansion of output above the
collusive level must trade off immediate profit gains with the increased
probability that the market price might fall below the trigger price,
thereby increasing the likelihood of an industry reversion and lower
profits.2 Alternatively, Porter [1985] describes how firms could focus
on market shares instead of a trigger price; in this case, large enough
deviations of actual from allocated market shares would trigger a price
war.
In the Green—Porter model, reversionary episodes sometimes will
occur simply because of low demand. They emphasize that such reversions
are not defections by any of the participants from the supergame.
Rather, in the uncertain environment of their model, reversions are
necessary to keep the equilibrium subgame—perfect; that is, to provide—5—
incentives for all firms to choose rationally to produce at cooperative
levels in normal times.
One testable prediction of the Green—Porter model involves the
cyclical behavior of prices and price—cost margins. Output is fixed in
their model unless a reversion occurs,If all demand shocks are
unobservable, prices and margins should be procyclical.3 While changes
in cost are not considered by Green and Porter, economy—wide inflation
should not affect the cooperative output level. All that has to be
updated is the nominal value of the trigger price. Shocks which
increase costs will reduce profit margins until the cooperative output
is updated, but prices will continue to be procyclical. If, however,
some demand shocks are observable and others are not, a definitive test
of the Green—Porter model with respect to the cyclical behavior of
prices may not be possible.
A second testable prediction of the Green—Porter model is that of
periodic sharp declines in industry price. Green and Porter [1984, p.
94] emphasize that according to their model industries having the
appropriate characteristics will exhibit price instability if oligopoly
members are colluding and that such episodes play an essential role in
the maintenance of an ongoing scheme of collusive incentives.
Roteinberg and Saloner [19861 present a second supergame model
employing trigger strategies and generating predictions about oligopoly
price behavior over the business cycle. As in Green and Porter, the
major departure of this model from the earlier literature is allowing
for industry shifts in demand. The major distinction between the two
models is that Rotemberg and Saloner assume that demand shifts are—6—
observable. In most other respects, including the set of industry
characteristics (homogeneous products, etc.) the models are alike.
Changes in industry demand cause firm payoffs to be
nonstationary. It is this nonstationarity that Rotemberg and Saloner
exploit. They do so by assuming that firms know the new levelof demand
before selecting their level of the choice variable in each period.
Once choice variables are selected, they cannot be adjusted untilthe
following period.
In this environment, the rewards for cheating on a collusive
agreement will be different from period to period, in generalvarying
positively with the state of demand. The future punishmentthat can be
inflicted on a cheater, however, is independent of current demand if
variations in demand are assumed to be independently and identically
distributed. Thus, in periods of sufficiently high demand, the rewards
from cheating on at least some collusive agreements may exceed any
future punishments. The likelihood of such an episode, of course,
depends on the length of the period for which a firm can cheat onits
4
competitors before retaliation can begin.
Rotemberg and Saloner suggest a method by which oligopolies may
keep firms from defecting. For periods of high demand, firms agree to
choose a price (quantity) low enough (high enough) such that the rewards
from defection are sufficiently reduced to keep cooperation the optimal
strategy. This is possible since industry demand is observable tothe
oligopoly. Their strongest results are for the case in which prices are
the strategic variable and marginal costs are constant. In this case,
increases in demand beyond a certain point actually lower the
oligopoly's prices monotonically. Their results are somewhat weaker—7
when quantity is the strategic variable, but they do present examples
where increases in demand again lead to more competitive behavior.
The testable prediction of the Rotemberg and Saloner model is that
the Lerner index is countercyclical; in booms oligopolies reduce the
spread between price and marginal cost to lower the per unit gain from
cheating. They present some rudimentary evidence that this may in fact
be the case in some industries. They also point out the practical
difficulties in testing their hypothesis using traditional measures of
the price—cost margin if movements in marginal cost and average variable
cost over the business cycle are not highly correlated. An alternative
test is to assume that marginal cost is procyclical and to test for the
cyclical behavior of price.
In the sections which follow, we provide some simple tests of the
predictions of these models for industry price—cost margins and prices
for a selected sample of manufacturing industries.
UI •LEVELSOFPRICE—COSTMRCINSFORSELECTED INDUSTRIES
One straightforward test of trigger—strategy models is to examine
whether the Census price—cost margin of any industry ever approaches
collusive levels in any time period covered by our panel. For
industries producing undifferentiated products, expressions can be
derived relating the price—cost margin (Lerner index) to industry
structural conditions for different types of industry behavior.
It is well known that5 for a given industry, a fir&s price—cost
margin (PCM) can he expressed as:
P —MC s (1+v )
P
——8—
where is the ith firms market share, is its conjectural variation
(the ith firm's guess about the output response of all other firms),and
c is the industry demand elasticity. Reference points of interest are
the monopoly outcome, PCM =1/c,and the Cournot outcome, P =
Wedo not have firm data and it is extremely difficult to estimate
marginal cost. However, industry expressions can be derived by
aggregating equation (1) across firms. If marginal cost isassumed to
equal average variable cost for each firm, then such an aggregationwill
yield6
P —AVC s (1+v)
(2) p
=
whereAVC is the industry—weighted average variable cost. The left—hand
side of equation (2) can also be expressed as the ratio of gross profits











whereH is the Herfindahl index of concentration.
Three points should be made about equations (3) and (4). First,
the difference between the predicted margins in equations (3) and (4)
(collusion versus Cournot) is very large. In manufacturing industries,—9—
Herfindahl indices above 0.35 are rare, while values much above 0.4 are
no longer observed.7 Secondly if MC differs from AVC, (P —AVC)/Pwill
result in a biased estimate of market power; this estimate will he
biased upward if marginal cost exceeds average variable cost, but the
opposite bias is theoretically also possible. Finally, if c is large
enough, then values of (P —AVC)/Pconsiderably less than unity are
consistent with collusion.
This final point, as well as the differences between predicted
margins in equations (3) and (4), are illustrated in Table I. For both
the Cournot outcome and the monopoly outcome, margins are calculated for
selected values of the Herfindahl index and the demand elasticity C
Itis apparent that elasticities must be quite high for the monopoly PCM
to be less than 0.50. It is also apparent that for the Cournot outcome,
PCMs are not likely to exceed 0.30.
We now turn to an examination of actual price—cost margins for
four—digit—S.I.C.—level Census manufacturing industries.8While Census
price—cost margins are only approximations to the Lerner index, they are
flow measures that are relatively free of accounting distortions.
Detailed descriptions of the data can be found in Domowitz, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1986a], [1986bJ.9 The full data set contains information on
312 manufacturing industries over the period from 1958 to 1981. To
focus on trigger—strategy models, we delineate a subsample of fifty—
seven industries in Table II. The common characteristics of these
industries are: (i) they are "producer—goods" industries;'0 (ii) they
have been recognized as Census industries at least since 1958; (iii)
they have four—firm concentration ratios'1 above 0.50 in 1972; and (iv)
they are not listed as "miscellaneous" or as "not elsewhere— 10—
classified."The object of (i) —(iv)was to select mature,
homogeneous—goods oligopolies operating in well defined markets. These
industries approximate the structural characteristics cited by Green and
Porter and Rotemberg and Saloner.
For each industry, Table II reports the following information: (i)
the Census four—firm concentration ratio and the Weiss—Pascoe adjusted
concentration ratio in 1972, (ii) the average value and the standard
deviation of the Census price—cost margin over the period from 1958 to
1981, and (iii) the minimum and maximum values of the price—cost
margin. In addition, Table II is divided into "high PCM" industries ——
thosewith average PCNs greater than the mean for producer—goods
industries, and corresponding "low PCM" industries. We will make use of
this division of industries by level of PCM later in the paper. One
would expect that the high—PCM industries are the ones most likely to be
collusive ——andthus to behave as per trigger—strategy models.
Unfortunately, we are unable to include Herfindahl values for the
industries in Table II. Nelson [19631 reports Herfindahl's for many of
the Table II industries, but they are out of date. As a point of
reference, Nelson's numbers indicate that industries with four—firm
concentration ratios between 0.80 and 0.90 (highly concentrated) have
Herfindahl's that cluster between 0.25 and 0.30.
Not unexpectedly, the industries in Table TI have, on average,
higher PCMs than the average for all producer—goods industries in our
panel, which is'2 0.250. However, the difference is not that great; the
average PCM for the fifty—seven industries in Table II is 0.289. If we
divide Table II into high—PCM and low—PCM industries, thirty—nine fall
into the former category, with an average PCN of 0.333. Within this— 11—
high—PCMgroup, only five have averages over 0.400 (flavoring extracts,
industrial gases, hydraulic cement, electric lamps, and photographic
equipment). The largest average P04 is 0.506. Even an examination of
each industry's maximum POt over the 1958—81 time period does not reveal
many particularly large margins; in only five instances does a maximum
P04 exceed 0.500, the largest recorded margin being 0.605.
There are several explanations for the patterns in Table II. One
possibility is that oligopolists are rarely able to engage in quasi—
cooperative arrangements such as trigger strategies. A second
explanation is that credible punishments are not large enough to permit
margins much above a one—shot equilibrium level; that is, trigger
strategies may not generally permit outcomes near the profit
frontier.'3 Oligopolists also may face much more elastic industry
demand curves than generally believed. A final explanation is, of
course, that the threat of entry, perhaps from import competition or
from the backward integration of major buyers of producer goods, may
keep margins at levels close to noncooperative levels for even very
concentrated industries.
IV.RESPONSES OPMARGINSAND PRICES TO DEMANDCHANCES
Weturn now to tests of the cyclical predictions of the trigger—
strategy models described in section II. The Green—Porter model
predicts that oligopoly prices and margins will be procyclical while the
Rotemberg—Saloner model predicts that price—cost margins will be
countercyclical. We therefore present evidence on the cyclical behavior
of both price and the price—cost margin for several categories of— 12—
industries,including highly concentrated producer—goods industries
having comparatively high margins.
While we present evidence on the cyclical behavior of price—cost
margins, we place much greater emphasis on the corresponding cyclical
behavior of prices. The reasons for this are as follows. With respect
to the Green—Porter model, the cyclical behavior of the price—cost
margin is probably a poor indicator of the cyclical behavior of price if
in fact output and average variable cost are not constant. With respect
to the Rotemberg—Saloner model, there are a number of reasons why the
cyclical behavior of (P —AVC)/Pmay he a misleading indicator of the
cyclical behavior of (P —MC)/P.During industry downturns, marginal
cost may fall below AVC because of labor hoarding. Rotemberg and
Saloner (p. 400) point out that measurements of labor costs may include
a fixed cost component. Finally, concentrated industries tend to be
more unionized, and most of the evidence indicates that the union—non-
union wage differential is countercyclical.'4
Cyclical Movements in Price—Cost Margins
In previous studies (see Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen [1986a],
[1986b]), we found that PCMs were more "procyclical" in concentrated
industries and in producer—goods industries than in consumer—goods
industries. In this paper, we extend our previous work by examining the
cyclical behavior of margins across several categories of industries as
outlined in section III. These categories are:(i) all industries,
(ii) industries for which C4 < 50, (iii) consumer—goods industries for
which C4 > 50, (iv) producer—goods industries for which C4 > 50, (v)
above—average PCN producer—goods industries for which C4 > 50, and (vi)— 13—
below—averagePCM producer—goods industries for which C4 > 50. This
partitioning of our sample by concentration is sensible given the models
we are interested in testing.'5
For each category of industries, we model the PCM as a function of
industry measures of concentration, capital—output ratio, advertising—
sales ratio, and capacity utilization in manufacturing'6 (as a measure
of aggregate demand). That is,
(5) PCM1 =o+ 81C4ft + 2(K/Q)i + 3(A/S)i + 4t +sit'
where i and t denote the industry and time period, respectively. OLS
and fixed—effects'7 estimation results for equation (5) appear in Table
III.
The effects of industry variables on the price—cost margin are
consistent with our previous results (see the interpretation there in
light of standard structure—conduct—performance models). With respect
to the impact of changes in capacity utilization on margins, our
principal findings are two. First, margins are procyclical in all
categories, though demand effects in unconcentrated industries are
negligible, with more pronounced cyclical impacts in concentrated and
producer—goods industries. Second, price—cost margins in concentrated,
high—PCX industries ("trigger—strategy industries) are less procyclical
than margins in concentrated, low—PCN industries. It will be easier to
interpret this result after the evidence on the cyclical behavior of
price and cost is presented.— 14
Price Wars and the Cyclical Responses of Industry Prices
For reasons discussed in section II, we are interested in both the
cyclical behavior of industry prices and in any evidence for the
existance of price wars, either during recessions or otherwise. We
begin with the latter issue.
It is straightforward to compute expressions for both the
percentage change in the PCI and in the industry price following a
reversion from monopoly to Cournot behavior. Using equations (3) and
(4) and assuming constant marginal cost, the predicted percentage change
in the PCM is (1_H)*100 and the predicted change in industry price is
[(l_H)/(c_H)J*100. These expressions imply quite dramatic changes
following a reversion. For example, if H =0.30and c =2,the
predicted percentage change in price is approxi—mately forty percent.
To analyze the prediction of the Green—Porter model of large,
discrete price decreases in periods of low demand, we report in Table IV
price changes'8 for thirty—nine "high—PCM" industries for 1961, 1970,
1975, and 1980, the four points in time when capacity utilization in
manufacturing fell below eighty percent. The sharpest declines occurred
in 1970 and 1975, when capacity utilization fell by ten percent and
thirteen percent respectively. These price changes are all expressed
relative to the rate of change for all manufacturing industries on
average in 1961, 1970, 1975, and 1980. While many industries do indeed
exhibit declines, (fifteen in 1970 and ten in 1975) these relative price
decreases are quite small ——certainlyless than what would normally he
expected from an industry reverting from a collusive to either a Cournot
or a Bertrand outcome in the middle of a recession.— 15—
Ofcourse, we can not be sure how an economy—wide recession affects
demand in any given industry; that is, output movements in individual
industries could "lead" or "lag" the business cycle. Large declines in
demand also occur for some industries in non—recession years. Such
demand shocks may be more difficult to observe and therefore more likely
to trigger the sort of reversion predicted by the Green—Porter model.
We therefore report in Table IV maximum price declines (and the years
they occurred) for the thirty—nine "high—PCM" industries. Incidences of
large price declines appear to be quite rare. In only two instances
(corn wet milling and X—ray apparatus) were there relative price
declines exceeding twenty percent.
The evidence in Table IV does not lend much support for oligopoly
price wars, at least not at the Census four—digit level of
disaggregation. We should point out, however, some qualifications. Our
data are annual, so that price wars of short duration would not show up
in Table IV. Punishments resulting from such short reversions, however,
would be very small and probably would not deter cheating. Another
consideration is that if margins are not greatly elevated by trigger
strategies for any of the reasons mentioned in the previous section,
then a price war (or a reversion to a one—shot equilibrium) may result
in only a modest decline in price.
We turn now to an assessment of the cyclical behavior of prices.
In the Green—Porter model, prices increase continuously with increases
in industry demand, although prices could fall discontinuously during
downturns in demand if a reversion occurs. In the Rotemberg—Saloner
model, prices fall continuously when demand increases beyond a certain
point.— 16—
Topursue differences across categories of industriesin response
of price changes to cyclical fluctuations, we begin with a simple markup
model of pricing. The target industry price P is determined as a
markup over unit cost C:
(6) =(1+Xi)Cit.
Variation in P arises both from changes in unit cost and from the
cyclical nature of the markup, A. This simple formulation does not
violate any of the main features of either the Green—Porter or the
RotembergSaloner model. The average markup, Xi, presumably depends on
such industry specific features as the magnitude of credible
punishments.
Letting lower case variables denote logs, we can reexpress equation
(6) as:
(7) Ait +
Takingfirst differences of equation (7), we obtain:
(8) Ai +ci
We assume that the markup A can be expressed as:
(9) A T ÷11t +Y2CU— 17—
where is the time—invariant industry component, ''allowsfor the
possibility of a secular time trend and is the cyclical component.
Differencing equation (9) and substituting into equation (8) we
19 obtain
(10) =1+ 2 + 13 Cj +
We note that differencing cost removes any fixed—cost comoonent that may
inadvertantly he entering into the computation of variablecost.2° The
coefficient on cost in equation (10) is unrestricted in the empirical
work reported below, rather than set to unity, as in equation (8).
Although this may entail a loss of efficiency in estimation if the
restriction indeed holds, our measure of cost is not perfect, and a unit
coefficient may not be appropriate.
We can extend this cyclical markup model to capture the idea that
differences in price adjustment across industries may also reflect
sticky prices due to costs of adjustment (Rotemberg 119821) or nominal
contracts (Hubbard and Weiner [1985J). If is the target industry
price adlustment, and =
(1_14) + 14 then equation (10)
can be rewrittenas21:
(11) a1 + a2 CU + a3 Cit ÷ a4
+
Results from estimating (10) and (11) using instrumentalvariables22
appear in Table V.— 18—
Withrespect to all concentrated producer—goods industries (high—PCM as
well as low—PCM industries) price movements are countercyclical. That is, the
coefficient on iCU is negative although only marginally statistically
significant. If we partition the sample into high and low—PCM industries,
however, differences appear. It is the high—PCN ("trigger—strategy") sub-
sample for which countercyclical price movements are statistically significant
and economically important. Concentrated producer—goods industries with low
average PCMs have procyclical price movements although thecoefficient on
ACU is measured with a large standard error. This pattern is robust to
whether or not a lagged dependent variable is included. The coefficients on
CU in the specifications including the lagged rate of change of prices imply
that a 10—percentage—point increase in the aggregate rate of capacity
utilization lowers the rate of change of prices in the high—PCM, concentrated,
producer—goods industries by approximately 1.3 percentage points, and raises
the rate of change of prices in the low—PCM counterparts by 1 percentage
point.
We considered two tests of the robustness of the results presented in
Table V. The first was to add an industry specific measure of demand
variation to equations (10) and (11). Demand variation coming from is
quite in keeping with the flavor of the Rotemberg—Saloner model and is
consistent with a strict interpretation of the imperfectly observed demand
assumption in the Green—Porter model. While it is difficult to construct good
proxies for industry specific demand variation, we entered such a measure in
equation (10) and (11). The coefficient on this variable was estimated with
large standard errors across categories, while the qualitative conclusions
reported above went unchanged.23— 19—
Asa supplementary test, we examined the cyclical behavior of cost
itself. We have found that concentrated producer—goods industries have more
procyclical price—cost margins and that concentrated high PCM industries have
countercyclical prices. These results lead one to expect that costs must be
more countercyclical for concentrated, producer—goods industries, and in
particular for the high—PCM category. While a formal study of cost behavior
is well beyond the scope of this paper, preliminary results indicate that
average variable cost is considerably more countercyclical for our
concentrated, high—PCM category of industries.24
The results in Tables 11—V shed some light on the two trigger—strategy
models described in the paper. The absence of large discrete price declines
during the period covered by our data combined with the countercyclical price
findings casts some doubt on the empirical validity of the Green—Porter
model. Our price findings are qualitatively consistent with the predictions
of the Rotemberg—Saloner model, as long as marginal cost is not
countercyclical. However, the movements in prices estimated here cannot be
described as large.
Interestingly, prices are "stickier" for the trigger—pricing subsample as
well (in the sense of a significantly higher coefficient on the lagged rate of
change in prices), indicating the need for additional research on sources of
possible differences in dyna1c price adlustment. That source of price
rigidity may well be quantitatively more Important than the differences In
contemporaneous adjustment to cyclical movements.
V. CONCLUSIONS MID IMPLICATIONS
There has been a significant interest on a theoretical level in the
application of supergames to oligopoly behavior. Implications for pricing— 20—
behaviorin trigger—strategy models in response to demand changes are of
particular importance for public policy considerations. We contrast the
predictions of two such models put forth by Green and Porter [1984] and
Rotemberg and Saloner [19861, and test the predictions using a panel data set
of U.S. manufacturing industries.
Our principal findings are four. First, the levels of price—cost margins
of concentrated, producer—goods industries, while higher than those of
unconcentrated counterparts, appear to be closer to those predicted by a
single—period Cournot—Nash equilibrium than monopoly. Second, there is little
evidence to support the idea that price—cost margins of these industries have
different cyclical patterns from other industries apart from effects by level
of industry concentration. Maximum price declines for concentrated industries
give little support for the occurrence of price wars during either recessions
or booms. Finally, consistent with the predictions of the Rotemberg—Saloner
model, the industries with high price—cost margins have more countercyclical
price movements than those exhibited by other industries. That gradual price
adjustment is quantitatively important for those industries, suggests,
however, that other factors may lie behind the apparent rigidity of prices.
These conclusions suggest two promising extensions for future research.
First, the results for interindustry differences in responses of PCMsand
prices to changes in aggregate demand suggest that countercyclical cost
movements are likely to be important in producer—goods industries (say sticky
real wages traceable to union bargaining agreements). Second, decomposing
manufacturing industries into subgroups based on industry concentration or
type of good produced, it is possible to test whether predictions of modelsof
price adjustment based on costs of adjustment, contracting, or strategic
considerations are consistent with the data. These extensions overlap— 21—
substantiallywith recent theoretical concerns of both industrial economists
and macroeconomists.— 22—
Notes
'Until recently, it was generally thought that finitely repeated games of the
"Prisoners' Dilemma" variety were inherently similar to a single—period game
(see the review in Friedman 11986J.).
2For each firm's cooperative output level to be the noncooperative action, the
marginal expected loss in future profits from triggering a Cournot reversion
must exactly balance the marginal gain from cheating on the agreement.
3Assuming that demand shifts are so imperfectly observed that output changes
never occur unless there is a reversion is extreme. Relaxingthis assumption,
however, and permitting a partial response (i.e., by allowing output tobe
somewhat procyclical) would not change the basic prediction that prices should
be procyclical with periodic sharp declines.
41f such a period were very short, defection would never be desirable.
See for example Waterson [1984, pp. 18—201.
6Multiplying equation (1) by q1/Q and summing across all firms in the industry
yields:








where F is fixed cost and the left—hand side of the equation is the ratio of
gross profits to sales.
7Consider as an example the automobile industry, one of the most concentrated
industries in the United States. The approximate market shares of General
Motors, Ford, Chrysler and American Motors are: 0.5, 0.25, 0.20, and0.05.
The Herfindahi index for this configuration of market shares is 0.355. Nelson
[19631 reports Herfindahi values for most of the existing four—digit Census
industries between 1947—1956. None of the Herfindahl's exceed 0.30. Nelson
was unable, however, to report H values for a few of the most concentrated
industries (e.g., aluminum).
8The PCM is defined as
=Valueof Sales +AInventories —Payroll
—Costof Materials
Value of Sales +Alnventories
which is identical to (Value Added —Payroll)/(ValueAdded +Costof
Materials) given the Census's definition of value added.— 23—
9meCensus of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures (published
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census) are the primary sources of information used
in constructing the panel data base. Other possible sources were not used
because of definitional problems, the short time period covered, or stringent
confidentiality restrictions. Data for most industries go back to at least
1958, and for some industries even as far back as 1947, allowing for a panel
of substantial length. Census definitional issues are discussed in Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a], [1986b]. The data are described therein, with
the exception of the capital stock series, which has been modified to reflect
a more realistic depreciation schedule.
'°The producer—goods/consumer—goods classification is taken from Ornstein
(1975]. Ornstein's classification is based on the percentage of shipments of
output for final demand in four categories: consumption, investment,
materials, and government. If fifty percent or more of an Industry's output
went to consumption, it was classified as a consumer—goods industry, if fifty
percent or more went to investment plus materials, it was classified as a
producer—goods industry.
''We used the four—firm concentration ratios constructed by Weiss and Pascoe
[1981]. They adjusted the concentration ratio for all Census industries for
1972 for inappropriate product groupings and geographic fragmentation.
'2This result Is consistent with the findings of several cross—sectional
studies of small differences in measures of profitability between concentrated
and unconcentrated industries. For recent examples, see Salinger (19841 and
Alberts [1984].
'3A necessary condition in the Rotemberg—Saloner model is that the magnitude
of the punishment be a binding constraint on margins and prices. Oligopolists
then have to lower prices to keep cheating incentives in line with punishments
when industry demand increases.
'4For an overview of the evidence, see chapter three of Freeman and Medoff
[1984].
15Rotemberg and Saloner note that their theory says nothing about the
volatility of price as concentration increases, only that once an industry
becomes an oligopoly it becomes more likely that it will cut prices in a boom.
'6Data on capacity utilization In manufacturing are taken from the Economic
Report of the President [1986].
'7An important potential qualification of the OLS results is that the
coefficient estimates may be biased by the omission of individual industry
effects. With panel data, we can account for unobservable persistent industry
differences; here we interpret "persistent" as time—invariant and reestimate
the model using the standard fixed—effects within—group estimator.
output price deflators are obtained from the four—digit—S.I.C.
level data base constructed by the Penn—SRI—Census project and updated and
extended at the National Bureau of Economic Research.— 24—
'9sincethe equation is in first differences, fixed unobservable industry
effects in setting prices have been removed. A natural way to interpret
equation (10) statistically, as well as equation (11) which follows,is to
view the original equation as one in the log levels of the variables,which
also includes a time—invariant industry component and a secular time trend.
Equations (10) and (11) are then the estimating equations for thefixed—
effects differencing estimator.
20The percentage change in unit labor costs is defined as the excess of the
percentage growth in wage rates over the percentage growthin output per
worker—hour. Industry specific data on the materials prices are not
available. Assuming a constant ratio of materials to output, the percentage
change in unit materials costs can be expressed as the percentage changein
the total cost of materials less the percentage change in industry output.
21Civen the interpretation of (11) as a fixed—effects estimating equation, we
note the problems associated with the use of a lagged dependent variable, as
exposited, for example, in Nickell (1986). The bias in coefficientestimates
is sharply reduced as the number of time—periods grows, and may be considered
negligible for the case here, given the length of our sample in thetime—
dimension.
22The endogenous variable is cost, of course. The instrument list included
the (current—period) percentage change in the aggregate industrial production
index, as well as percentage changes in cost and output prices lagged two
periods. The first lag of the last two variables was not used, due to the
nature of the error term under the fixed—effects interpretation given in
footnote 13. Ordinary least squares estimation of (6) and (7) yielded results
which were quite similar to those reported here. The main effect of using an
instrumental—variables scheme was to enlarge the standard errors of the
estimated coefficient on the percentage change in cost.
23We constructed the percentage rate of change in industry output (i/Q)
as a proxy for industry demand fluctuations. Industry output Q was
constructed as the quotient of the sum of current—dollar value added and cost
of materials and the industry—specific output deflator. The percentage rate
of change of output was orthogonalized with respect to changes in the
aggregate rate of capacity utilization. An instrumental variables procedure
was employed to eliminate the potential simultaneous equations bias inherent
in regressing the change in prices on change in output.
The results from adding Q/Q to the model in equation (11) are given below.
The results for all unconcentrated industries (C4 < 50), concentrated low—PCM
industries, and concentrated, high—PCM industries, respectively, are:
=0.007+ 0.021 CU + 0.807 Ac1 + 0.143 — 2 =0.84
(0.001) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012)
=0.003+ 0.118 ACU + 0.786 Ac1 + 0.112 + R2 =.80
(0.002) (0.065) (0.071) (0.033) (0.060)
=0.005—0.129ACU + 0.551 Ac + 0.313
it—i
+ 2=
(0.003)(0.043) (0.040) (0.022) (0.030)— 25—
estimatedAc as a linear function of the lagged percentage change in cost
and ACU. The results for all unconcentrated industries (C4 < 50),
concentrated, low—PCM industries, and concentrated, high—PCM industries,
respectively, are:
Ac1 =0.036+0.169Acit 1 —0.217ACU; =0.07
(0.001) (0.015) (0.030)
Ac1 =0.044+0.086Acji —0.404ACU; 2 =0.06
(0.005) (0.051) (0.111)
Ac1 =0.038+0.129Ac1 —0.644ACU; 2 =0.14
(0.003) (0.030) (0.065)— 26—
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Implied PCMs forSelectedDemandflasticities and HerfindahlIndices
Monopoly Outcome*
£ 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
POt 1.00 0.80 0.67 0.57 0.50
**
CournotOutcome
£ 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
R
0.15 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08
0.20 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.10
0.25 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.13
0.30 0.30 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.15
0.35 0.35 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.18
Note: *Based on equation (3) In text.
**Based on equation (4) in text; entries in the matrix are PCM values;
H denotes the Herfindahl index.TABLE II
Price—Cost Margins for Concentrated Producer—Goods Industries
Standard Minimum Maximum
Industry Adjusted AverageDeviation of PCI't PCM
(SIC) C4 C4 PCM PCM (Year) (Year)
HIgh—PcM Industries
Flour(2045) 68 62 0.306 0.030 0.232 (1978) 0.348 (1970)
Corn Wet
Milling (2046) 63 63 0.290 0.042 0.191 (1973) 0.345 (1960)
F lavo ring
Extracts (2087) 66 62 0.483 0.033 0.413 (1975) 0.528 (1979)
Manufactured
Ice (2097) 32 86 0.392 0.030 0.317 (1971)0.444 (1973)
Pressed and Molded
Pulp Goods (2646) 75 75 0.332 0.049 0.165 (1980) 0.389 (1977)
Alkalines and
Chlorine (2812) 72 60 0.369 0.038 0.299 (1980) 0.422 (1975)
Industrial Gases (2813) 65 78 0.503 0.059 0.423 (1958) 0.605 (1970)
Inorganic Pigments (2816) 52 52 0.365 0.063 0.269 (1978) 0.447 (1964)
Synthetic Rubber (2822) 62 54 0.279 0.057 0.170 (1981) 0.356 (1969)
Organic Fibers (2824) 74 70 0.380 0.093 0.231 (1975) 0.493 (1958)
ExplosiveS (2892) 67 69 0.272 0.077 0.126 (1970) 0.380 (1980)
Carbon Black (2895) 74 74 0.393 0.114 0.160 (1980) 0.514 (1968)
Tires & Tubes (3011) 73 73 0.273 0.030 0.227 (1964) 0.334 (1973)
Reclaimed Rubber (3031) 78 74 0.277 0.068 0.171 (1970) 0.500 (1979)
Flat Glass (3211) 92 83 0.362 0.042 0.296 (1981) 0.446 (1972)
Products of Purchased
Glass (3231) 43 54 0.270 0.019 0.242 (1970) 0.318 (1960)
Cement, Hydraulic (3241) 26 73 0.436 0.045 0.339 (1981) 0.490 (1959)
Brick and Structural
Tile (3251) 17 65 0.292 0.037 0.217 (1960) 0.352 (1977)
Gypsum Products (3275) 80 79 0.356 0.068 0.237 (1976) 0.446 (1963)
Mineral Wool (3296) 71 72 0.337 0.032 0.291 (1963) 0.413 (1977)
Primary Aluminum (3334) 79 69 0.315 0.047 0.208 (1981) 0.390 (1968)
Turbines (3511) 90 80 0.276 0.041 0.206 (1969) 0.340 (1960)
Internal Combustion
Engines (3519) 50 74 0.241 0.021 0.197 (1960) 0.276 (1971)
Elevators (3534) 55 52 0.323 0.069 0.186 (1980)0.421 (1969)
Ball Bearings (3562) 53 70 0.274 0.014 0.239 (1969) 0.295 (1981)
Scales, Balances (3576) 50 63 0.335 0.055 0.267 (1962)0.436 (1980)
Transformers (3612) 59 69 0.271 0.022 0.231 (1972) 0.313 (1959)
Switchgear (3613) 51 62 0.321 0.031 0.261 (1961) 0.384 (1981)
Motors & Generators (3621) 47 55 0.270 0.026 0.230 (1961) 0.316 (1977)
Carbon and Graphite
Product (3624) 80 79 0.350 0.019 0.314 (1972) 0.398 (1975)
Sewing Machines (3636) 84 80 0.306 0.082 0.128 (1958) 0.433 (1972)
Electric Lamps (3641) 90 87 0.450 0.016 0.416 (1958) 0.474 (1975)
Telephone Apparatus (3661) 89 88 0.266 0.030 0.178 (1968) 0.308 (1978)
Storage Batteries (3691) 57 58 0.260 0.040 0.194 (1960)0.350 (1966)
Primary Batteries (3692) 92 91 0.373 0.043 0.288 (1981)0.446 (1972)
X—Ray Apparatus (3693) 54 52 0.324 0.044 0.251 (1961) 0.415 (1972)TABLE II (continued)
Price—Cost 1(argins for Concentrated Producer—Goods Industries
Standard Minimum Maximum
Industry AdjustedAverageDeviation of PCM PCM
(SIC) C4 C4 PCM PCM (Year) (Year)
Engine Electrical
Equipment (3694) 65 76 0.284 0.016 0.244 (1980) 0.315 (1976)
Environmental
Controls (3822) 57 57 0.333 0.028 0.287 (1979)0.377 (1961)
Photographic
Equipment (3861) 74 86 0.458 0.053 0.350 (1958) 0.537 (1971)
Low—PM Industries
Tobacco
(Drying) (2141) 67 66 0.051 0.014 0.031 (1963)0.078 (1978)
Man—Made Fiber,
Finishing Plants (2262) 56 56 0.195 0.021 0.161 (1974) 0.232 (1968)
Thread Mills (2284) 62 58 0.192 0.027 0.155 (1978) 0.255 (1974)
Tire Cord and FabrIc (2296) 84 81 0.111 0.022 0.073 (1959)0.153 (1974)
Sanitary Food
Containers 2654) 46 56 0.250 0.019 0.203 (1980) 0.276 (1968)
Fiber Cans (2655) 54 52 0.213 0.013 0.190 (1960) 0.238 (1974)
Cellulosic Fiber (2823) 96 70 0.250 0.090 0.109 (1978) 0.361 (1966)
Ready—Mix Concrete (3273) 6 51 0.233 0.013 0.207 (1961) 0.258 (1969)
Electrometallurgical
Product (3313) 74 88 0.216 0.050 0.105 (1958) 0.326 (1974)
Malleable—Iron
Foundries (3322) 52 51 0.212 0.036 0.126 (1958)0.265 (1976)
Primary Copper (3331) 72 60 0.138 0.044 0.047 (1975)0.281 (1969)
Primary Zinc (3333) 66 57 0.160 0.047 0.074 (1971) 0.276 (1964)
Copper Rolling and
Drawing (3351) 39 51 0.143 0.024 0.108 (1975) 0.202 (1966)
Metal Coating (3479) 15 72 0.248 0.032 0.192 (1972) 0.306 (1981)
Construction
Machinery (3531) 43 63 0.244 0.033 0.133 (1960) 0.280 (1978)
Mast Furnaces and
Steel Mills (3312) 45 51 0.202 0.026 0.151 (1981) 0.238 (1965)
Aircraft (3721) 66 82 0.218 0.059 0.130 (1959) 0.328 (1976)
Aircraft Engines (3722) 60 60 0.226 0.042 0.157 (1960) 0.303 (1979)
Note: The adjusted concentration ratio is that reported in Weiss and Pascoe [1981J.TABLE III




All C4 50C4 > 50(C)C4 > 50(P)C4 > 50(PH) C4 > 50(PL)
Constant 0.107 0.131 0.173 —0.040 0.087 —0.032
(0.017) (0.019) (0.061) (0.048) (0.051) (0.058)
C4 0.110 0.092 0.143 0.185 0.127 —0.006
(0.0005) (0.008) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
A/s 1.064 1.106 1.125 0.433 0.224 1.755
(0.031) (0.052) (0.053) (0.088) (0.077) (0.380)
K/Q 0.030 0.027 —0.041 0.055 0.024 0.065
(0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
CU 0.096 0.077 0.039 0.197 0.165 0.227
(0.021) (0.022) (0.070) (0.056) (0.059) (0.067)
—2
0.275 0.169 0.467 0.183 0.086 0.147
Fixed—Effects Results
Industries
All C4 50C4 > 50(C) C4 > 50(P) C4 > 50(PH) C4 > 50(PL)
C4 0.123 0.136 0.133 0.122 0.199 0.007
(0.010) (0.012) (0.030) (0.029) (0.041) (0.032)
A/S 0.003 —0.327 0.077 0.225 0.208 1.010
(0.054) (0.084) (0.089) (0.121) (0.133) (0.840)
K/Q —0.017 —0.007 —0.003 —0.044 —0.051 —0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
CU 0.078 0.066 0.118 0.116 0.103 0.161
(0.010) (0.012) (0.034) (0.028) (0.039) (0.038)
0.037 0.041 0.059 0.065 0.080 0.047
Note: C, P, PH, and PL denote consumer—goods industries, producer—goods
industries, high—PCM producer—goods industries, and low—PCM producer—
goods industries, respectively. C4 refers to the Weiss—Pascoe adjusted
measure (see footnote 7). Standard errors are in parentheses.TABLE IV
Price Increases and Decreases in Bigh—PM Industries
Maximum Price
Industry Decrease
(SIC) (Year) 1961 1970 1975 1980
Flour (2045) —10.4% (1976) 0.9% 0.4% 7.6% —5.5%
Corn Wet Milling (2046) —22.2 (1976) 3.5 4.0 2.9 2.4
Flavoring Extracts (2087) —19.4 (1976) 0.1 —2.0 3.9 2.3
Manufactured Ice (2097) —9.7 (1980) 0.2 1.0 0.8 —9.7
Pressed and Molded Pulp
Goods (2646) —3.9 (1974) —2.6 0.2 —3.0 —2.2
Alkalines & Chlorine (2812) —10.0 (1979) —0.6 —3.0 35.1 1.2
Industrial Gases (2813) —11.6 (1977) 0.0 4.6 11.3 0.1
Inorganic Pigments (2816) —4.8 (1980) —0.6 —3.3 3.0 —4.8
Synthetic Rubber (2822) —6.4 (1974) 0.2 —3.2 0.1 4.6
Organic Fibers (2824) —14.2 (1974) —1.4 —3.9 —13.3 —3.1
Explosives (2892) —3.9 (1959) 3.3 —1.7 6.0 —3.7
Carbon Black (2895) —7.5 (1978) —3.0 —2.5 27.6 8.0
Tires and Tubes (3011) —4.8 (1962) —0.4 2.6 0.6 —1.0
Reclaimed Rubber (3031) —6.8 (1980) 0.5 —3.5 —1.7 —6.8
Flat Glass (3211) —15.3 (1974) —2.5 1.9 —5.5 —7.7
Products of Purchased
Glass (3231) —16.2 (1959) —1.1 —0.7 —1.0 —6.2
Cement, Hydraulic (3241) —9.1 (1959) 0.4 5.5 7.2 —5.9
Brick and Structural
Tile (3251) —10.7 (1959) 1.1 0.6 —0.1 —7.8
Ceramic Tile (3253) —13.6 (1974) 0.6 —3.4 —2.4 —10.2
Gypsum Products (3275) —12.7 (1980) 2.6 —6.9 —6.1 —12.7
Mineral Wool (3296 —9.4 (1979) —5.4 2.9 13.0 —3.8
Primary Aluminum (3334) —19.1 (1972) —4.3 1.8 —5.0 5.5
Turbines (3511) —9.5 (1974) —9.1 5.6 15.0 3.5
Elevators (3534) —6.5 (1974) 1.2 5.6 7.8 —4.6
Ball Bearings (3562) —7.6 (1965) —1.5 1.7 4.0 0.5
Scales, Balances (3576) —9.6 (1974) 0.8 —0.2 0.0 5.7
Transformers (3612) —8.3 (1969) —4.4 2.0 5.7 —6.4
Switchgear (3613) —5.4 (1972) 0.8 2.0 5.9 —1.9
Motors and Generators (3621) —6.1 (1974) —2.7 3.3 4.1 —3.8
Carbon and Graphite
Product (3624) —5.0 (1976) —0.4 0.5 17.6 —0.9
Sedng Machines (3636) 9.4 (1974) 1.4 1.3 4.9 —8.6
Electric Lamps (3641) —8.8 (1974) 0.3 0.4 10.7 —5.0
Telephone Apparatus (3661) —11.2 (1974) —1.7 1.1 11.8 —6.0
Storage Batteries (3691) —10.6 (1980) 0.9 3.2 3.1 —10.6
Primary Batteries (3692) —15.4 (1974) —0.8 —1.7 5.8 —10.6
X—Ray Apparatus (3693) —20.0 (1959) —0.6 3.0 4.5 —1.5
Engine Electrical
Equipment (3694) —11.9 (1959) —0.2 1.6 7.0 —4.4
Environmental
Controls (3822) —18.1 (1959) 2.0 12.4 0.8 —7.4
Photographic
Equipment (3861) —12.8 (1974) 1.1 —1.5 —1.1 4.9
Note: Price increases and decreases are relative to those for all industries on average.TABLE V
Cyclical Sensitivity of Prices by Category of Industry
Dependent Variable:
7.tp %c CU —2
Constant it—i it t R
All Industries 0.010 0.817 —0.034 0.820
(0.0007) (0.012) (0.011)
0.005 0.227 0.718 0.016 0.812
(0.001) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012)
C4 < 50 0.009 0.864 —0.021 0.839
(0.0008) (0.014) (0.013)
0.004 0.184 0.781 0.028 0.831
(0.001) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014)
C4 > 50(C) 0.009 0.810 —0.047 0.788
(0.003) (0.053) (0.040)
0.005 0.455 0.503 —0.074 0.777
(0.003) (0.033) (0.060) (0.042)
C4 > 50(P) 0.011 0.718 —0.053 0.782
(0.002) (0.033) (0.031)
0.006 0.284 0.584 —0.032 0.776
(0.002) (0.019) (0.035) (0.032)
C4 > 50(PH) 0.012 0.685 —0.106 0.764
(0.002) (0.040) (0.040)
0.005 0.347 0.518 —0.127 0.768
(0.002) (0.023) (0.042) (0.040)
C4 > 50(PL) 0.011 0.768 0.039 0.828
(0.003) (0.056) (0.048)
0.008 0.174 0.672 0.098 0.814
(0.004) (0.032) (0.062) (0.052)
Note: C, P, PH, and FL denote consumer—goods industries, producer—goods
industries, high—PCM producer—goods industries, and low—PCM producer—goods
industries, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.